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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
J. EARL MORRIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
C. LEO CHRISTENSEN and DALE 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
9217 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case concerns an intersection collision involving 
plaintiff's automobile, going east on 9000 South, Salt Lake 
County, and an automobile driven by defendant C. Leo Chris-
tensen, and owned by his son, counterclaimant Dale Chris.-
tensen. With Dale Christensen asleep in the car C. Leo 
Christensen had been driving north on State Street. At 
the intersection 9000 South had two lanes and was 41 paved 
feet wide, and State Street had four lanes and was 70 paved 
feet wide. 
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Plaintiff sued for damages against the defendant and 
counterclaimant, both of whom counterclaimed. At the pre-
trial conference the negligence of defendant C. Leo Chris-
tensen was conceded. Plaintiff's complaint against the 
defendant Dale Christensen was dismissed, leaving him in 
the case as a counterclaimant (R. 83-85). 
The case was tried before Merrill C. Faux, Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, With-
out a jury. Judge Faux rendered judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant, and dismissed the coun-
terclaims. Defendant and counterclaimant appeal from that 
judgment. 
Plaintiff testified that at about 6 :30 a. m., December 
26, 1958, he was driving east on 90th South Street, ap-
proaching State Street, in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 13). 
He was alone in his car, a 1955 Mercury (R. 14. Ex. 1-P). 
The weather was clear. The road was dry. Daylight was 
breaking, but plaintiff's headlights were still necessary and 
were on (R. 14). The intersection had bright street light-
ing (R. 14). As he arrived at State Street, the traffic sema-
phore was red against him. He stopped his car and waited 
about 30 seconds for the light to change color (R. 24). When 
the semaphore turned green for him, he waited for a car 
on State Street to stop. This car was in the west, inside, 
lane of northbound traffic (R. 15). While plaintiff had 
been stopped his visibility in all directions was unobstructed, 
except for the signs of a corner gas station on his right, 
south. This minor obstruction did not prevent him from 
being able to see to the south "a considerable distance" (R. 
28). 
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As plaintiff crossed the west side of State Street there 
was no hazard nor approaching traffic from the north, his 
left (R. 28, 29). His headlights illuminated 9000 South to 
the east) ahead of him, for several hundred feet and there 
were no hazard nor approaching traffic coming from that 
direction (R. 28, 29). There was no traffic behind him (R. 
29) . In regard to his looking south there is some variance 
in his testimony, although he admitted that as he crossed 
the center of State Street, south was the only direction from 
which traffic might come (R. 31). In substance plaintiff 
looked to the south once as he crossed the intersection ( R. 
29-31), and this was "as I was nearing the center of the 
intersection I looked to the south * * *" (R. 31). The 
stopped car in the west lane of northbound traffic did not 
substantially impair plaintiff's view of State Street to the 
south (R. 29). After crossing the center of State Street 
and clearing the stopped northbound car, plaintiff was not 
sure if he looked south again (R. 29). 
Plaintiff failed to see the car driven by defendant. 
Plaintiff testified "Well, I proceeded across and I was 
nearly through the intersection and just the instant before 
impact why I saw this car hit me. It was too late for me 
to do anything about it" (R. 15). Plaintiff had no expla-
nation for not seeing the car driven by defendant (R. 31). 
He affirmed his answer given on deposition that he first 
saw the car driven by defendant "just at the time the crash 
occurred" ( R. 28) . 
Plaintiff knew that the speed limit on State Street was 
40 miles per hour (R. 24). 
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Plaintiff had some variance in locating the place of 
impact. He testified that at impact his car was ( 1) 14 or 
15 feet from the east ed:ge of State Street (R. 16), (2) 
"nearly through the intersection" (R. 15), (3) "Well, I 
would say that it is about in the center of the east lane of 
the northbound traffic" ( R. 25) , and ( 4) affirmed his 
answer given on deposition "Well, it wa~it was on the east 
side of State Street; the east traffic and it was nearly off 
the street. When he hit me he turned-he turned the way 
that I was going, east, somewhat to try and miss me, I sup-
pose, and that is where the accident occurred, nearly off of 
State Street" (R. 25, 26). 
Prior to impact plaintiff did not change course or speed 
and did nothing to avoid the collision (R. 25, 60). His speed 
at impact was 12 to 15 miles per hour (R. 51). 
Impact of the collision was received on the right front 
of plaintiff's car between the front wheel and front door 
(R. 26, 51). 
Plaintiff's witness, Joel Lund, was the driver of the 
car that had stopped for the semaphore in the west lane of 
northbound traffic ( R. 32) . Mr. Lund testified that plain-
tiff had the green light ( R. 33, 35) . He located the place 
of impact as "Well, it was a little bit off to the east of the 
outside lane" ( R. 34, 36) , that is that the impact occurred 
off of, and east of, the traffic lanes of State Street. He testi-
fied that, at impact, the car driven by defendant was headed 
north (R. 35), or northeast (R. 36). Mr. Lund did not see 
defendant's car until the impact (R. 34). 
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Deputy Sheriff H. J. Houmand, the investigating offi-
cer, testified as follows for plaintiff. He diagrammed the 
intersection and stated that 9000 South had two traffic 
lanes, was paved for 41 feet and had 7 feet of shoulders, 
for a total width of 48 feet ( R. 42, 43) . State Street had 
four paved traffic lanes, with two of them for northbound 
traffic and two of them for southbound traffic ( R. 40). 
The lanes were separated in the center by double, yellow, 
painted lines (R. 40). State Street was bounded by curbs 
and a retaining wall and had no substantial shoulders (R. 
42, 43). It had a paved width of 70 feet (R. 42). 
Officer Houmand placed the point of impact at 14 feet 
from the center of the intersection (R. 39). Plaintiff's car 
was damaged on the rear of the right front fender and door-
post (R. 51) and the car driven by defendant was. damaged 
on the left front (R. 50). He did not determine the speed 
of the car driven by defendant from its skidmarks (R. 42), 
but stated that the debris from the collision was. concen-
trated in a two or three foot area (R. 47). He affirmed 
that on his officer's report he had: indicated the speed limit 
on State Street was 40 miles per hour ( R. 43, 44) . He stated 
that the car driven by defendant left 38 feet of skidmarks 
prior to the point of impact (R. 39, 46), that these skid-
marks angled off to the east in a straight line (R. 46, 47), 
and that both cars came to rest east of the point of impact 
with the plaintiff's. car 8 feet east of the car driven by 
defendant and that car being 14 feet from the point of im-
pact (R. 39, 40, 45, 46). When asked why the two cars 
came to rest in this position he stated "I would assume that 
the Christensen-that the Christensen car was trying to 
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miss the ~orris car." He was then asked "Q. You mean 
it was turneq toward the east at the impact?" and he re-
plied "A. That's right" (R. 46). 
At the close of plaintiff's case a motion was made to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint "on the ground that the plain-
tiff's evidence shows plaintiff to be guilty of contributory 
negligence which was the subs~antial, proximate cause of 
the accident" (R. 53). The motion was denied. 
Defendant C. Leo Christensen testified that he was the 
father of the ·counterclaimant herein (R. 54, 55), and that 
he was driving and the counterclaimant sleeping in the car 
at the time the accident occurred (R. 55). Defendant had 
been driving automobiles for 33 years and had had no prior 
automobile accidents of any kind (R. 56, 57). 
Defendant testified that he had been driving straight 
through from Payson, Utah, that he had not been drinking 
(R. 56), and that counterclaimant's. car was in good mechan-
ical condition (R. 57). Approaching the subject intersec-
tion he was driving at about 40 miles per hour, and had 
been in the outside, east, lane of traffic for 6 or 7 miles (R. 
57). 
He failed to see the semaphore until he was about 100 
feet from the intersection. At that time the semaphore was 
yellow. He did not look at it again (R. 57). He first saw 
plaintiff's car at the· same time that he first saw the sema-
phore. Plaintiff was then just coming to the west edge of 
the State Street pavement and was moving slowly-at 2, 3 
or 4 miles per hour (R. 64). At that point defendant took 
his foot off the accellerator (R. 67, 68). He thought that 
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he had the right of way because he was so close to the inter-
section that he couldn't stop and the light was yellow (R. 
57, 70). He was vague on when he first apprehended dan-
ger from plaintiff (R. 67-70). 
Defendant next saw plaintiff when plaintiff was in 
the middle of the intersection. At this point defendant was, 
by defendant's testimony, 20 feet south of the intersection's 
south edge (R. 64), and about 35 feet from plaintiff (R. 
65) . He estimated that he had lost 5 miles per hour in speed 
since letting up on the accellerator (R. 68). He then, for 
the first time, applied his brakes. (R. 65). 
When defendant braked, he turned right, east, to avoid 
plaintiff ( R. 59), but couldn't turn sharply because of a 
ditch bordering the east edge of State Street (R. 59). He 
was headed northeast at impact (R. 60). At impact he esti-
mated that he and plaintiff were both going at about the 
same speed-12 to 15 miles per hour (R. 60). 
Defendant claimed that the point of impact was 14 feet 
east of the paved portion of State Street (R. 60, 65). Impact 
occurred on the left front fender of the car he was driving 
(R. 60). He assisted Officer Houmand in making measure-
ments of the scene after the accident (R. 61, 65), and stated 
that Officer Houmand was in error in his statement that 
the impact occurred 14 feet from the center of the intersec-
tion. He pointed out that this measurement would place the 
impact in the inside, west, lane of northbound traffic, and 
that he and Officer Houmand had actually taken the 14 foot 
measurement from the east edge of State Street, not from 
the center of State Street (R. 61, 65). It would. appear 
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that Officer's Houmand's location of the point of impact 
is contrary to all of the rest of the testimony, and further 
that it would place the impact in the west lane of north-
bound traffic, which would be very difficult as that lane 
was occupied by the Lund car (R. 32). This location of the 
place of impact is also inconsistent with the officer's own 
statement that defendant's "skidmarks angled to the east 
going off of the road" (R. 47). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THE PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, 
WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE, CONTRIBUT-
ING, CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE. TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THE PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, 
WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE, CONTRIBUT-
ING, CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The issue is whether the plaintiff, as a matter of law, 
was guilty of negligence which was a proximate and con-
tributing cause of the accident, even though plaintiff had 
the right of way, under the following facts: ( 1) Plaintiff 
had been on a minor road and had been stopped for 30 sec-
onds waiting for the traffic semaphore to change so that 
he could cross an arterial highway (R. 24), (2) plaintiff 
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had accellerated from. the stop and had gone across, or 
almost across, the 70 foot wide arterial highway before 
impact (R. 15, 16, 25, 26, 34-36, 60, 65, 78, 79, 80), (3) there 
had been no traffic approaching which might have diverted 
plaintiff's attention as plaintiff crossed the intersection 
(R. 28, 29), and, at the place of impact, defendant was ap-
proaching from the only direction from which plaintiff 
should have known, and did know, that cross traffic or 
hazards might approach (R. 31), ( 4) plaintiff had had 
virtually unobstructed visibility in all directions at all times 
since first stopping at the intersection (R. 28, 29), ( 5) de-
fendant had been approaching plaintiff on the arterial 
highway within the speed limit and plaintiff knew the speed 
limit (R. 24, 43, 44, 66), ( 6) plaintiff failed to see d~ 
fendant before impact (R. 15, 28, 31), and (7) defendant 
had approached at 40 miles per hour (R. 57), had not 
braked nor changed course until 38 feet from the place of 
impact (R. 39), and was clearly not yielding right of way 
to plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was still in position to 
easily avoid the collision (R. 58, 59, 63-65, 69, 70). 
Negligence may be determined as matter of law under 
a given state of facts., even though all inferences are in 
favor of submitting the issue to the jury or of upholding 
a fact finding of no negligence. 
Johnson v. Syme, 1957, 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 P. 2d 
468, 
Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 1944, 106 Utah 
278, 282, 14 7 p. 2d 875, 878. 
The facts given above in the statement of the issue 
fairly represent the evidence in the light most favorable 
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to plaintiff, and the law as applied to these facts indicates 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
The most recent Utah case with a very close factual 
similarity is Johnson v. Syme, supra. Its principles have 
been affirmed in Fox v. Taylor, 1960, Utah, 352 P. 2d 154. 
In Sy·me a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Utah, plaintiff being found 
negligent as a matter of law. The similarities of Syme and 
the instant case are: Both occurred on South State Street-
Syme at 13800 South, and the instant case at 9000 South; in 
both cases the defendant ran traffic stop signals and clearly 
failed to yield right of way or take evasive action, and in 
each case this was, or should have been, apparent to the 
plaintiffs at a time when the plaintiffs could have avoided 
the collisions. Where the two cases differ the instant case 
is less favorable to plaintiff, in that in Syme the plain-
tiff saw the defendant before impact; in Syme the 
plaintiff's speed was 50 miles per hour and in the instant 
case plaintiff's speed rose from a stop to 12 to 15 miles per 
hour (R. 51), giving plaintiff herein more time in which to 
look for oncoming traffic and greater ability to stop quickly; 
and in Syme, plaintiff was on an arterial highway in the 
country and defendant entered from a side road, so that 
plaintiff therein was exposed to a lesser probability of cross 
traffic. 
A driver with right of way may proceed until it is clear 
that if he does so there· is danger of a collision. Accordingly 
cases such as Bates v. Burns, 1955, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 
2d 209, allow a driver with right of way to proceed without 
fault into a position of peril, even though his lookout might 
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have been inadequate, if that driver could reasonably have 
assumed that the other driver would yield. to him. 
The instant case is distinguished from Bates v. Burns, 
and other Utah case with similar conclusions, because of 
factual differences, and is in accord with their legal princi-
ples. In Bates the plaintiff perceived danger when the other 
vehicle was 150 feet away. Plaintiff tried thereafter to 
avoid the danger, but couldn't do so because he was in an 
old truck with a low rate of accelleration. Prior to that 
time even if plaintiff had noticed defendant, plaintiff could 
have assumed that defendant would yield, as defendant had 
room in which to yield and had not manifested negligence 
nor failure to yield. 
In the instant cas.e plaintiff made no effort to avoid 
peril because he never saw defendant (R. 15, 28, 29). 
In Bates, plaintiff had a Hobson's choice. He couldn't 
tell which direction defendant might choose when defendant 
tried to avoid him. In the instant case defendant could not 
swerve to his right, east, because of the curb and ditch (R. 
43, 59), nor left, west, because of the Lund car which was 
stopped in the west, inside lane of northbound traffic ( R. 
15, 32). 'Vhen defendant braked he chose the only course 
open to him-going ahead and to his right (R. 46, 47, 59, 
60). This left plaintiff with a clear choice as to his remedial 
action. 
It is recognized that the disfavored driver has a greater 
obligation than the favored driver to choose the right di-
rection in which to swerve, Bates v. Burns, supra, but in the 
instant case defendant had no choice. It might be argued 
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that he could have continued straight ahead, but this re-
quires an unnatural reaction from him in a split second, 
and presumes that plaintiff's course of travel, which could 
have been so readily altered, would not change. Plaintiff's 
speed was low, he could still have stopped, and defendant 
was not obliged to consider plaintiff negligent. 
It should he noted that the impact occurred on the right 
front of plaintiff's car and the left front of defendant's car 
(R. 26, 50, 51). Considering this. and the fact that defen-
dant's swerve to the right delayed the impact, it is clear that 
a collision would have occurred if defendant had continued 
on in a straight line. 
Reviewing the vital factors of time and distance, plain-
tiff entered the intersection when defendant was 100 feet 
away (R. 57, 58). At this time defendant was too close to 
stop. Because of this and his belief that the light was yellow, 
he assumed that he had the right of way, and that plaintiff 
would yield. He eased up on the gas, his habit when cross-
ing an intersection, but did not brake (R. 64, 67, 69, 70). 
Plaintiff had determined that there was no traffic ap-
proaching from any other direction (R. 28, 29) and that any 
hazard would come from the south (R. 31). His duty was 
to give greatest attention to the greatest source of hazard. 
Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P. 2d 788. 
Merely because he had the right of way given by the sema-
phore, plaintiff was. not excused from the duty of every 
driver to keep a proper lookout and· in that lookout to see 
what was to be seen. Fox v. Taylor, supra, Johnson v. Syme, 
supra, Bates v. Burns, supra, Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 
390, 216 P. 2d 640, Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 
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2d 437, Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., supra, in 
which the basic, lifesaving rule of the road is well stated as 
"The supreme rule of the road as to motorists at street in-
tersections in cities is the rule of mutual forbearance." 
Plaintiff failed in this duty, either not looking or not see-
ing. If he had seen he would have been alerted to the im-
minent arrival in the intersection of the defendant. 
Both cars continued in straight lines until defendant 
was 20 feet from the intersection and 35 feet from plaintiff 
who was then under the traffic light (R. 59, 60, 64, 65). 
During this interval plaintiff could have effectively stopped 
or slowed at any time while crossing the 35 foot wide west 
side of State Street, or the 171/2 foot wide west lane of 
northbound traffic which was shielded by the Lund car 
(R. 15, 32). 
Defendant then braked and swerved right, east, leaving 
38 feet of skidmarks running northeast (R. 39, 46, 59, 60). 
Plaintiff continued blindly on. 
If the trial judge's comment that defendant "chased" 
plaintiff 14 feet east of the intersection (R. 79), be inter-
preted as a finding of fact, then plaintiff had the whole 
width of State Street in which to see and avoid defendant. 
As pointed out above, defendant could not reasonably have 
been expected to not swerve. In addition defendant was 
angled away from plaintiff at impact (R. 46, 47, 59, 60). 
Accordingly, if plaintiff had followed the natural, and under 
the circumstances logical, reaction of braking and swerving 
away from danger, there would have been no collision. This 
conclusion follows with equal force regardless of which 
point of impact is chosen from the testimony. 
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Right of way terminates when it is clear that the other 
driver will not observe it, or poses an immediate hazard·. 
Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59, Bates v. 
Burns, supra. The duty of forbearance and avoidance then 
becomes paramount. Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 
supra. The failure to yield can be manifested most directly 
by the disfavored driver being so close to the favored driver, 
and going so fast, that the disfavored driver cannot yield. 
Under the above stated facts it appears that the plain-
tiff had a clear opportunity to see defendant and recognize 
the hazard, and negligently failed to do so, and that plain-
tiff had clear opportunities which he failed to take due to 
his negligence, and that plaintiff therefore proximately 
contributed, without excuse, to the accident. 
The doctrine of "last clear chance" has not been raised 
as an issue, but deserves mention. It is not applicable 
against the defendant, even if it be assumed that the de-
fendant apprehended danger 100 feet from the intersection 
and plaintiff was just entering, because at that point ( 1) 
defendant was too close to the intersection to sto·p (R. 70), 
and so had no clear chance, and (2) plaintiff was not then 
in a position of peril. Fox v. Taylor, supra, McMurdie v. 
Underwood, 1959, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711. 
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CONCLUSIO·N 
Appellants submit that the trial judge erred in not 
finding the plaintiff guilty of negligence which was a proxi-
mate cause of the subject accident, and request that relief 
be granted by remanding the case for a new trial with ap-
propriate instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. SAMUEL KING, 
Attorney for C. Leo Chris-
tensen, Defendant and Ap-
pellant, and for Dale Chris-
tensen, Counterclaimant and 
Appellant. 
405 Executive Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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